

AN
A T T E M P T

TO OBVIATE THE
PRINCIPAL OBJECTIONS

MADE AGAINST THE DOCTRINE OF
PHILOSOPHICAL NECESSITY;

OCCASIONED BY
PHILARETUS'S
R E P L Y

TO
AUGUSTUS TOPLADY.


BY PHILALETHES.

I also will shew mine opinion. Job xxxii. 17.
He that is able to receive it, let him receive it. Matt.
xix. 12.

L O N D O N :

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M.DCC.LXXVI.



INTRODUCTION.

I MEAN neither to *defend* nor *offend* any man, but to propose my thoughts candidly, and as clearly as I can. I have attempted to find the meaning of Philaretus, and have not taken any advantage of merely verbal errors, apprehending that I may be no less justly chargeable with such imperfections. — *Humanum est errare.* — I mean, also, to keep close to the subject matter of this controversy, without digressing from it to cast any *personal reflection*, which often misleads the judgement, and inflames the passions, of mankind.

De veritate certo, non victoriâ.

The reader is desired to bear in mind that Philaretus asserts, "*Reasons and motives do not NECESSARILY DETERMINE a man's actions, yet they are the OCCASIONS of action:*" that a man "*is not DETERMINED to act this way or that by his ideas and views of things, but that he FREELY DETERMINES HIMSELF (when free from external compulsion) according to those motives which are MOST agreeable to his DISPOSITION.*" See p. 36.



An ATTEMPT, &c.

CHAP. I.

A power to act doth not imply a power not to act, at the same time. — A distinction between the means of acting and the power of acting. — Inclination and volition determined by motives. — The soul not freer than to act as it wills. — Attention governed by motives and the state of the mind.

IN p. 12, Philaretus asserts, “ *A power to act necessarily implies a power not to act, at the same time.*” Were this possible, then a will to act necessarily implies a will not to act, at the same time; for Philaretus acknowledges, p. 101, that “ *the willing not to do a thing is as positive as the willing to do it.*” But to have two wills at the same time, appears to me as impossible as for two bodies to be in the same place at the same time. A volition or motion cannot be completed in one point of duration, it must have a beginning and an end; therefore, one point of duration, at least, must exist between these two extremes.

Philaretus seems to have an erroneous notion of abstract power. — Until the mind has some volition, and only while it is in a state of volition,

is it endued with a *power* of action: * nor can it have more than *one* volition, much less *contrary* volitions, at the same time. Though a man has money in his pocket, yet, if he does not *will* to give a beggar a halfpenny, he is under an inability, equal to any physical one, to give it: *i. e.* he has no more power of doing it than if his hands were bound: and, *willing* to give a beggar a halfpenny, (having a halfpenny in his pocket, and all external impediments being removed,) he has not a *power* to *forbear* giving him a halfpenny; unless he has a power of forbearing *contrary* to his *will*, which I cannot admit. †

The mind doth not *determine* its own volitions; but, as the volitions are, so will it act or forbear to act. *Ideas* and *Impressions*, to which the mind is passive, appear to me the *causes* of volitions. A *volition* is not produced by an *act* of the *mind*, but the *act* of the *mind* by *volition*. There cannot, therefore, I presume, be any *act* of the mind *without* a volition, nor any act of it *contrary* to volition; if it were possible, such an act would not be a *voluntary* act. — By what power does the mind exercise or exert its *self-motive power* *this way* rather than *that*? We must enquire after this *power*, which determines the mind's volition to act *this way* rather than *that*, and see whether that is not a power *ab extra*. Philaretus says, “It is no contradiction to suppose a being to exist *without motion*.” But doth it not imply a contradiction, to suppose that a *dependent being*, at rest, can put

* Whether *acting* or *doing* be a proper term, to express any mode of the soul's existence, I shall not contend with Philaretus.

† I distinguish here between the *means* of giving or acting *power* of giving or acting.

put *itself* in motion, or that it can, of *itself*, *uninfluenced by any other being*, alter the *mode* of its existence, whether it be in *motion* or at *rest*?

Let any man "consider, in a short time after any material action is past, whether, if he were once more put in the same rigidly exact circumstances as he was in *the instant before he did it*, he could possibly do otherwise than as he did. — Here the imagination will intervene, and be apt to deceive the enquirer, unless he be cautious; for, in this review, other motives, besides those which did actually influence him, *will* start up; and that especially if the act be such as he wishes to have been performed with more vigor or less, or not to have been performed at all: but, when these motives are set aside, and the imagination confined to those which did in fact take place, it will appear impossible, as it seems to me, that he should have done otherwise than the very thing he did." — "To suppose that the action A, or its contrary, A, can equally follow previous circumstances, that are exactly the same, appears to me the same thing as affirming that one or both of them might start up into being without any cause; which, if admitted, appears to me to destroy the foundation of all abstract reasoning, and particularly of that whereby the existence of the first Cause is proved." *Hartley's Observations on Man.*

It is customary to say, "If I *had known* as much as I do *now*, I would not have done so or so." — "Had I *seen the thing* in the light I *now see it*, I would not have *consented* to it." This agrees strictly with *philosophical necessity*; but we always voluntarily *act* (if the word will not offend) according to the *present view* or *appearance* of things, and the *motives most agreeable to the disposition*

position of our minds. But it will, perhaps, be said that the mind can *suspend* acting, and wait for more clear information; *true*, if the *most agreeable motive*, in the view of the mind, is, that it will be *best* to *suspend* acting: the *determination* of the mind, to *suspend*, is also the physical effect of our *ideas* and *sensations*.

It appears to me that we cannot have the *liberty* which Philaretus supposes, unless the mind be in a perfect *state of indifference*, to the *motives* *encompassing* it, when it exerts its *self-motive* power *this way* rather than *that*. But it is evident the mind is not in such a state, if *some* motives are *most agreeable* to its *disposition*: and, if the mind is not the efficient cause of its volitions, it cannot be *freer* than to act according to its volitions. And I do conclude, that the human soul is not a *self-determining* being; that is to say, it cannot *act* of itself upon itself, to give itself a *volition*, to put itself in *motion*, or to alter the *mode* of its existence, any more than it can be the *author* of its existence, or *annihilate* itself. Any being, whose existence depends on any other being, will, in some manner, be constantly *influenced* by that other being.

P. 31. "We cannot avoid perceiving things according as they appear to the mind, though their appearance will often be much altered by a greater or less degree of attention to them, which it is in our power to give: nevertheless, according to the appearance of things, the soul is necessarily impressed with pleasing or disagreeable sensations."

I cannot grant that it is in our power to give a greater or less attention, in the *present time*, than what we do give, any more than it is in our power to avoid perceiving things as they appear in the *present time*. Our attention seems to me, on all occasions

occasions and at all times, necessarily proportionate to the inclination we have to attend, which is different, as to degrees, in different men, and in the same man too, at different times. Our attention to objects is governed by motives the most agreeable to our dispositions; and, if the attention of the mind be diverted from an object, something, more agreeable to the disposition of the mind, calls or draws it off. Convinced that we cannot determine our attention to the state of our minds, Philaretus says, p. 123, "May be (i. e. God) turn our attention," &c. Till God turns it, can it be turned? When God himself commands, can his power be withstood?

CHAP. II.

The effects of moral and physical causes equally variable. — Motives and views necessarily produce volitions. — Men always act according to the state of their minds; granted by Philaretus.

PAGE 12. "A cause, which operates by a physical necessity, uniformly produces the same effect, except in some cases, where an extrinsic compulsory force is able to restrain its operations. Moral causes do not operate as physical ones do, their influence constantly varying according to the state of the mind affected by them; so that they may, and often do, exist without those effects, which, at other times, they may be said to produce, even when there is no extrinsic compulsory force to prevent their operation."

A cause, which operates by a physical necessity on bodies, doth not appear to me more uniform, in

in its effects, than a cause which operates by what is termed a *moral necessity* on minds. The eye, which is illuminated to-day by the rays of the sun, may be so altered to-morrow, by events which were not to be avoided, as to cause no impression of light on the mind. A *medicine* also shall produce an effect this day contrary to what it produced yesterday. The operation of *physical causes* on bodies vary their effects, according to the varied state of organized bodies, no less than what are called *moral causes* vary their effects on minds, according to the different *states of minds*, or of the *same mind*, on which they operate; and the *state of the latter* (i. e. the mind) appears to me as subject to *change*, or to be *changed*, by the necessary influence of *unknown causes*, as the former, i. e. the body.

Counsel, exhortation, admonition, and censure, produce not the *same effects* in the minds of *different men*, nor in the mind of the *same man*, at *different times*, yet their effects may be *necessary* at all times.

But Philaretus says, p. 54. "That motives and views are not the efficient causes of action, seems plain, from this, that, if they operate as physical causes, they must be physical beings; that is, they must have a real existence in nature." This argument is not a new one; nor, indeed, do any of his arguments appear new to me. But I answer, we have no immediate knowledge or perception of any *other beings* than what Philaretus seems to think are *non-entities*, or that have no *real existence*: but I think that whatever is *perceived* must have a *real existence* while it is *perceived*; a *non-entity* can have no *properties*, but *ideas* have *properties*, they necessarily excite *pleasure* and *pain*: Nothing, or a *non-entity*, is not an object of *perception*; the ob-
jects

jects of our *perception*, called *non-entities*, are *all* the objects we can *immediately perceive*, and all our knowledge is derived from them ; for reflection is but attentively perceiving the *relation* of *ideas* in the *view of the mind* : the material causes (if there be any) of our *ideas* are not *perceived*, but their existence is *inferred* from our *sensations* and *ideas*. A tree, a house, a man, are supposed to be *archetypes* of corresponding *ideas* excited in the mind. We acquire even all the knowledge we have of *God*, or a *first intelligent Cause*, by no other means than by the intervention of *ideas*, either *mediately* or *immediately* produced : and that *ideas* are *physical causes* of *actions* or *motions*, both *voluntary* and *involuntary*, is evident to me. The reading an account of a murder causes a series of *perceptions* in the view of my mind : my blood is chilled, and returns with an increased velocity to my heart, and I have a *painful sensation*. The idea of *cheese* will turn some people *sick* ; and the sudden report of *good* or *bad news* has caused, in different people, a *syncope*, or *fainting*, and sometimes even *death*.

But let us consider this subject again ; a review may set it in a clearer light. *Physical beings*, acting on the *organs*, necessarily impress the mind with *sensations*, *agreeable* and *disagreeable*, or *painful* and *pleasurable* : and the operation of the same *physical beings*, on the organs of sense, affect the *minds* of *different men* differently, and the *mind* of the *same man* too, at *different times*, according to the *different construction*, *texture*, or *physical state*, of the organs, which are variable : hence the vulgar proverb, *One man's food is another man's poison*. *Sweets*, *acids*, and *bitters*, are *agreeable* to some men, to others *disagreeable* ; and we may, I think, " Account for moral as for natural

natural things." On reading the *holy scriptures*, or any other *scriptures*, different men have different *appearances*, *ideas*, or *perceptions*, and *notions*, and the same man too, at different times, according to the *state of their minds*; and every man necessarily judges of *moral*, as well as of *natural*, things, by the *impressions* and *ideas*, or *appearances*, in his own mind, and can no more judge by *other mens impressions* and *ideas*, than he can see with *other mens eyes*, hear with their *ears*, or taste by their *palates*: hence men differ about both *moral* and *natural* doctrines, and conceive different, and even *contrary*, doctrines, from the same text. And thus I apprehend the most agreeable *motives*, which determine the judgement of one man, are sometimes the most disagreeable to some other men, and to the same man too, at different times: but, as we are apt to wonder that those *moral* or *natural objects*, which are agreeable to ourselves, are not agreeable to all other men, we are no less apt to conclude, that other men are deceived, and that we only are in the right; and we also apprehend that it is owing to want of taste, willful blindness, a corrupt heart, or inattention, that other men do not think as we think, and are not determined as we are determined; concluding it is in the power of others to determine themselves, as we think we determine ourselves. But we may as well wonder other men cannot see with our eyes, hear with our ears, or taste by our palates, as that some doctrines should appear glorious consolatory truths to some men, which other men detest as horrible.

Let us now enquire by what means a stone falls. A stone is moved toward the center of the globe by the attraction of gravity. But what is gravity? Others may define and refine as long as they please, I believe they must at length acknowledge, that

it is not a *material unintelligent cause*, or a *creature*. The *will of God*, which is the *power of God*, appointed that all bodies should gravitate, or move, toward some common center. Whatever he *wills to exist*, exists, and in the *mode too* which he wills it to exist in.

We are as *necessarily affected by ideas*, or, to use the words of Philaretus, *encompassed with motives*, as a *stone falls to the ground*; some occasion *involuntary*, and others *voluntary motions*; for *voluntary motions* pre-suppose *involuntary ones*, as their *generating cause*, in the manner that *ideas* do *sensations*.

As certain bodies *attract* each other, and form *one mass*, or *system*, till the particles, of which they are composed, are *stronger attracted* by other particles which cause a *dissolution of continuity*, (as in *metals*, immersed in a *fluid menstruum*,) so the *mind* is *excited to move toward*, or *recede from*, objects that are *agreeable* and *disagreeable*, by the *mental affections of love and hatred*, which correspond to *attraction and repulsion*; and those motives which, at *this instant*, are the most *agreeable* to the *disposition of the mind*, will *determine its voluntary motion this way*, if no *external cause* prevents; and, till motives which are *more agreeable* arise, they will continue to *determine it the same way*; but, when *motives more agreeable* appear, and *supplant or rival* them, then the *mind* will be *determined to move voluntarily another way*. I think, therefore, that *all necessity* is *purely physical*, and that no *essential distinction* is to be *predicated of the terms moral and physical*, but that they may be *used as convertible terms*.

Rewards and punishments, censure and commendation, exhortations and admonitions, are in the *concatenation*

catenation of necessary causes, and are productive of good effects, as experience testifies. The agreeable motives, which determined some people to actions or motions productive of evil, have been supplanted by more agreeable motives, excited by exhortations, admonitions, and punishments: but moral applications to the mind have not always the same effects, at different times, upon the same mind, nor the same upon different minds, any more than medicines, upon the same and different bodies, yet they have always a necessary effect.

P. 32. "*How a merely passive perception of the mind can be the physical cause of an action, I confess, I do not understand.*" I conceive, Philaretus understands as clearly *how* a perception of the mind is the physical cause of an action, as he does *how* attraction and digestion are performed. We see bodies move toward, and unite with, each other, but we cannot see nor understand the *modus how* the power acts, in causing bodies to move in any direction, or in uniting them; nor, indeed, have we any *abstract* idea of power, any more than of motion. Perceptions necessarily excite passions, and the voluntary motions of the mind correspond to motives the most agreeable to the disposition of the mind as regularly as any physical effects in the universe.

I do not mean to assert, that reasons, or motives, or perceptions of the mind are the immediate efficient cause of the action or motion, but that the action or motion necessarily follows the volition, which is necessarily determined by them; but *how* reasons, motives, or perceptions, necessitate volition, is incomprehensible to me: I will, however, undertake to explain this process, if Philaretus will demonstrate to me *how* an immaterial substance is annexed to, and contained

tained in, a *material substance*, and how those two substances reciprocally act upon each other; or how an *immaterial being* can be endued with consciousness and intelligence, any more than a *material being*.

In order to establish the doctrine of *free-agency*, I conceive it must be demonstrated that man is the *efficient cause* of his own volitions. — *Action*, or *motion*, necessarily follows a volition to act (all external impediments being removed); and therefore, unless man be the *efficient cause* of his own volitions, he cannot be the *efficient cause* of his actions or motions; i. e. he is not a *self-determining being*.

P. 36. “But, though reasons and motives do not necessarily determine a man’s actions, yet they are the occasions of action: and every rational being will so much the more determine itself to act according to the most rational motives as it is itself more rational and perfect.”

According to this doctrine, every creature acts as rationally as it can, at all times, and therefore does always according to what can be reasonably required of it. If A determines himself to act according to more rational motives than B, it only supposes, that, at the time A determined himself, he was in a more rational and perfect state than B; and, if A determined himself according to more rational motives, yesterday, than he does to-day, it supposes that the state of A’s mind was more rational and perfect yesterday than it is to-day. Hence, merit and demerit, praise and blame, reward and punishment, remorse and self-approbation, are terms as improperly applied, on the subject of *free-agency*, as on that of *philosophical necessity*. Man’s rationality, or rational powers, and the state or disposition of

B

his

his mind, are influenced by the *weather, change of climate, hunger and thirst, diet, exercise and rest, sickness and health*, with a thousand other *physical*, as well as *moral*, causes, which it is not in a man's power to prevent; and, if he determines himself, in the *present* time, according to the *present* view of things and the *present* state of his mind, can he, at the *same time*, be free, or have a power to determine himself differently? and, when he determines himself to act as appears to him the most rational and fit, or best upon the whole, has he a power, at the same time, *not to act* according to the *present* appearance of things, and the *present* disposition of his mind, be it more or less *rational and perfect*? — I think we may fairly infer, from our *author's premises*, “that every man acts up to the rule of divine appointment in the fullest degree, and that he cannot possibly deviate from it in any one point.” See p. 71. But it does not follow, (see p. 122.) that prayer is *needless*; for, according to the doctrine of necessity, every thing is necessary that does happen.



C H A P. III.

The freedom of God asserted. — Action improperly applied to God. — Contingency of events incompatible with divine prescience. — Consequences deduced from the positions of Philaretus.

PAGE 84. Philaretus thinks it must clearly appear, that contingency “*necessarily arises from the free-agency of God*;” and, p. 98, “*if a thing*

thing that is contingent cannot be of God, then the world cannot be of God." God is doubtless totally uninfluenced by any being *ab extra*. Such are his wisdom and goodness, that he can will nothing that implies a contradiction; and, as his *will* is uncontrollable, he is perfectly FREE. But if, by *agency* in God, is meant *action*, I think it is improperly applied to God in *creating*. A being that *acts* must act upon *itself*, or upon something *external* which is *not itself*. Previous to the creation, there was *nothing* for God to act upon *without himself*, because *nothing existed without himself*; if, therefore, he acted upon any thing in creating, he must, I conceive, have *acted upon himself*,* and created *out of himself*: but it implies an absurdity to suppose that a creature could be made *out of its Creator*, as it would not be a *creation*, but a *partition* or *division of himself*; and, as God is *indivisible*, that cannot be admitted: besides, it would involve us in the error of Spinoza, who asserted that there was but *one substance* in the universe. A creature cannot effect any thing, which it *wills* to effect, without acting upon something without itself: but we should not, I presume, attribute this creaturely imperfection to the DEITY, who is OMNIPRESENT and OMNIPOTENT. Whatever God *wills* to exist, exists by virtue of his *will*, which is his *power*, without *action*: *power* and *will*, in God, I think, are convertible terms.—*Motion* also is, I think, improperly applied to God, who is IMMUTABLE: *motion* implies *mutability*; but God is *immutable*, without *variableness*.

B 2

* I cannot conceive that any being can act immediately upon itself, as it implies that it is both *agent* and *patient* at the same time.

bleness or even a shadow of turning, — filling all things, comprehending all things: whence, then, can he move from, or where can he move to? Creatures, indeed, are moved, according to the will of God; but God himself is *immovable*. *Action*, or the exertion of power, supposes resistance: when the power exerted is superior to the resistance, it accomplishes its end; and *vice versa*. But, previous to the creation, nothing existed, and therefore nothing for the supreme Power to be exerted upon, and consequently nothing to prevent the existence of whatever he willed to be. We may hence, I think, attribute the creation solely to the divine will, without any exertion of power or action. And, after the world was created, unless we suppose the Almighty gave a power to any of his creatures to resist or oppose his will, (which were to contradict himself,) all their different modes of existence are according to his will or appointment, without his acting or exerting a power (which supposes resistance) to accomplish it: but, if any motion in the universe happens by the exertion of a self-motive power in the creature, God willed that the bodies moved by this power should be subservient to the direction of it, governed in its exertion by the most agreeable motives; and, as these motives are not in the power of the creature, but are produced or caused by the necessary influence of perceptions and sensations, to which the mind is passive, then *divine permission* and *positive appointment* are convertible terms; but, that a *self-motive being* should determine its motions by *motives encompassing it*, appears to me a contradiction. I conceive that the will of any being must be either positive or negative; that is to say, that a thing should be

or should not be : now, a *permissive will* implies neither. Would any reputed wise creature ever permit any thing to happen contrary to his will or command, who has full power to bring about every thing according to his will or command, if that permission would necessarily prove injurious to the person acting in consequence of it, and the not permitting it would prove highly beneficial to him ?*

I understand what is meant by *permission* amongst men, but cannot clearly apprehend what is meant by *permission* in God. I will suppose myself at the elbow of a giant, who watches over me ; I want to go from him, but his power I cannot overcome, his vigilance I cannot elude : he, however, tells me that he *permits* me to go : — I go ; but this supposes that I am capable of moving *independently* of any influence from him ; yet I cannot move *independently* of God's influence, on whom I never cease to *depend*. Is not the power, by which a man does *evil*, derived from God, as well as that by which he does *good* ? — God, it is said, *abhors sin* ; and *sin* is the transgression of a law : — God, it is said, commanded A to keep his law, and thereby manifested a *positive will* that it should not be broken, and consequently that the *evil*, which entered by sin, should not be introduced ; and yet, it seems, he endued A with *full power*, and *permitted* him to *oppose* this will, break his commandment, and thereby introduce *evil*. Are a *positive prohibitory will* and a *permissive will* one will or two wills ? If God commands one thing, and another comes to pass, then can it be said that whatever he commands comes to pass ? for

B 3

whatsoever

* The vulgar maxim is generally approved ; that it is better to *prevent* than to *cure*.

whatsoever comes to pass cannot be at once *ac-*
cording to his command and *not according* to his
 command. But it seemed that God *commanded*
 something to be omitted, and at the same time
permitted it to be done: it was contrary to his
 nature too; it displeased him; — he had full
 power to have prevented it, and yet he did not
 prevent it. Is it not strange, that a Being, who
 is inherently good, should endue any of his crea-
 tures with a self motive power to do evil, if that
 evil could have been prevented by not enduing
 them with it?

With regard to prescience, if any event that
 happens does not *necessarily* result from the consti-
 tution of things, I cannot conceive that it can
 be *foreseen* by any being: but it appears that all
human actions or *voluntary motions* do result neces-
 sarily from the constitution of things.* The
 mind is *passive* in *perceiving*, and, according to
 the appearance of things and its present state or
 disposition, is *necessarily* impressed with pain or
 pleasure; so that *some* motives are *more* or *less*
agreeable, *others* *more* or *less* *disagreeable*: and, as
 its *actions* or *motions* correspond to the *most agree-*
able motives, a being, who *foresees* the different
 states of the mind, foresees also what *motives* will
 be *most agreeable* to it, and, of course, the *actions*
 that *inevitably* follow them.

Whatever God *knows*, I conceive, he *knew*
 from all eternity, or his knowledge had a *be-*
ginning, which can no more be admitted than
 that his *existence* had a beginning. Whatever
 God has created he *decreed* and *knew* he should
 create

* I conceive that *ideas* and *impressions* as *necessarily* produce
 a *volition* to *act*, as the *act* produced by the *mind* in a *state* of
volition is *necessarily* produced by the *mind*.

create from *all eternity*; and, if the world be *not* eternal, yet God decreed from all eternity that it *should be* created † when it *was* created, and that it *should be* constituted in the manner he did constitute it; and, whether intelligent creatures are endued with a *self-motive power*, *agents* or *patients*, he decreed from all eternity that they should be constituted as they are constituted; and therefore the world is not contingent, unless the *eternal decrees* of God himself are contingent, *i. e.* might *not have been*; which, to me, implies a contradiction.

I desire Philaretus to reflect, if two men, exactly in the same circumstances, having the same view of things, and being in the same state of mind, could freely determine themselves differently, (*i. e.* one to act according thereto, and the other not,) whether the determinations and actions of both or either could have been foreseen or foreknown by any being.

P. 17.

† I do not give the following as my own opinion; but submit it to the consideration of the reader.

“Nor can we know any more concerning the time, than the manner, of creation; or determine whether the creatures may not have been co-eternal with the Creator: for, though they be effects requiring an efficient cause to produce them, yet an effect may be well eternal when the cause is so. I could easily believe the Thames to have run eternally if I could persuade myself that the springs supplying it had flowed for ever: and, if there always had been a sun, there would have been no beginning of day-light. So, though the creation depended upon a superior Power for its existence, it may nevertheless have subsisted from everlasting, because that Power was never wanting whereon it might depend: nor let it be urged, that the will and good-pleasure of God must set Omnipotence at work before there could be any thing created: for, when we reflect on the immutability of the divine nature, we can no more assign limits to the determination of his will, than to the exercise of his power.” E. S. Esq. p. 271.

P. 17. " We all see it is no natural contradiction to suppose that God may again destroy the world by water." — " The impossibility that God should again destroy the world by water is not founded on the abstract nature of the divine power, but on his being a God of truth." Ibid.

Philaretus supposes a distinction, which I think is not real, betwixt the will and the power of God, as if they were *toto genere* different. I have not any abstract idea of power, i. e. abstracted from the divine will. To me, as I have already said, power and will, in God, are convertible terms, if, as a God of truth, he cannot destroy the world again by water. As he is *naturally* or *necessarily* (i. e. by necessity of nature) a God of truth and immutable, to suppose that he has a power to do that which he willed from all eternity, and declared in time, he would not do, is, I think, to suppose that he has a natural power of acting contrary to his nature; which, to me, implies a contradiction. I do not pretend to determine what God can or cannot do; but I believe that whatever God wills to be, or not to be, necessarily shall be, or shall not be, accordingly.

The doctrine of free-agency supposes that man has a power of destroying life, and also of giving life. If man's self-motive power is the efficient cause of voluntary actions, I think it must be acknowledged that man can bring beings into this world, without the positive appointment of God, as well as expel them from it, or destroy life, without his positive appointment; and a man is as much the efficient cause of life, when he begets a child without the positive appointment of God, as he is the efficient cause of death when he commits *selo de se* without the positive appointment of God.

Philaretus

Philaretus says that *God is the author of all good*; but, if man is really a *free-agent*, it appears to me that *God is no more the author or efficient cause of good than of evil*. When a *free-agent* determines himself, he is supposed to be *uninfluenced* by any other being: the *most agreeable motives*, by which he determines himself, have no physical influence upon him; at most, they only furnish an *occasion* or an *opportunity* of acting; when, therefore, a *free-agent* determines himself to an action *formally good*, it is as much his *own act* as when he determines himself to an action *formally evil*. Obedience to God's commandments is as much his *own act* as *disobedience*, and the Almighty appears to me *no more the author of the good which follows obedience to his commandments than of the evil which follows disobedience*. Good is as much the natural or necessary consequence of *obedience*, as *evil* is of *disobedience*, according to the supposed laws of God's moral government. If *life* and *death*, *good* and *evil*, become the objects of a man's choice, and he is not moved to prefer either by the physical influence of any other being, but *freely* determines himself to either, I think it may be inferred, that man is *as much* the author of a *good choice*, and a *good act*, as of an *evil choice*, and an *evil act* — of his *own happiness*, as of his *own misery*. If it be said, that the grace of God presents the most agreeable motives, by which a man determines himself to *good actions*, influencing his mind, by the *agency of the Holy Spirit*, to *choose the good*, then the man cannot be said to determine himself *freely*, because he is influenced by the agency of another being: but, if a man determines himself to act according to the *state of his mind*, then he cannot at the *same time* have

have a power of determining himself *not to act* according to that state. Does a man, or does he not, act according to the state of his mind? Is it in his power to *alter* the state of his mind? Can he be, to himself, the *cause* or *author* of his disposition or state of mind? If you say it may be altered, by attending to it, and to the teachings of God's grace, — true: but, if the disposition of his mind is such, that he does *not attend*, then, as soon as he does attend, or *inclines* to attend, there is an *alteration* in the disposition or state of his mind, which either had no cause, or must have been caused by the influence of some being *ab extra*.

P. 106. “He [i. e. God] therefore permitted evil to enter, and he permits it to reign: not for want of power to hinder it, nor of knowledge to foresee all the consequences of it, nor of goodness to do that which was *best*; but because it was his divine will and pleasure to permit man so to determine himself, and thus to allow the entrance and continuance of evil, so far and so long as it shall seem good to his infinite wisdom.” I presume we may fairly infer several propositions, from this passage, in favour of philosophical necessity. — God had power to prevent evil, but it was his will to permit it, and yet he did not want goodness to do that which was *best*: why then did he not prevent it? — Since he did not, may we not safely conclude, from your own premises, that the existence of evil in the system of his works is *best*? It seems good to his [i. e. God's] infinite wisdom that it should continue: — then the continuance of it too is *best*: and hence also we may conclude, that, when it shall cease to be the *best*, God will exclude it from his works. We may likewise infer, that, if his creatures could have been
better

better (i. e. happier) without his suffering evil to enter and reign in his works, than they have been, are, or will be, by his having permitted it to enter and continue in them, then, doubtless, a being that wanted neither power, nor knowledge, nor goodness, would have precluded evil from his works.*

*"Of systems possible, if 'tis confess'd,
That wisdom infinite must choose the best,"*

that system, which is *best* calculated to confer the *greatest degree of happiness* on the sentient intelligent creatures in it, is the *best* to them, and, I conceive, the most worthy of God.

CHAP. IV.

Man no more an object of blame or commendation, on the hypothesis of human liberty, than on that of philosophical necessity. — The origin of evil as difficult to account for, on the hypothesis of free-agency, as from philosophical necessity.

PAGE 110. "A man can therefore be no more blameable for that action which necessarily results, with all its particular modes, from the vibrations of his brain, the motion of his blood, and flow of his animal spirits, than he is for those vibrations, &c. themselves." — The scriptures, indeed, speak of God's approving and disapproving, blaming

* I conclude, the *best* state of any being is the *happiest* state.

ing and commending, — of his anger, wrath, and vengeance; — so they do of his talking, face to face, with a creature, — of his laughing, walking, riding, sitting, showing his back-parts, repenting even till he was wearied with repenting, and of his being grieved to the heart; and every person accepts such texts, as well as all others in both sacred and profane writings, according to the sensations and ideas which they excite in his mind; and, as they are different in the minds of different men, and in the mind of the same man at different times, so they must accept them differently, unless there be also a freedom of human judgement; that is to say, of judging contrary to appearances.

If a man cannot help judging according to the appearance of things, and cannot determine himself but by the motives most agreeable to his disposition or state of mind, and it be not in his power to alter that state or those motives, does it not follow that this moral necessity, which is said to be consistent with LIBERTY, is equal to a PHYSICAL NECESSITY? and that a man is no more blameable, or commendable, for determining himself to certain actions, than he is for the appearance of things, the agreeableness of motives, the vibrations of his brain, the motion of his blood, or the flow of his animal spirits? for, if a man determines himself by the most agreeable motives, he has not, I think, properly speaking, a liberty of contradiction or contrariety.

Philaretus's notion of free-agency "stands as much opposed to chance and fortuitousness as necessity itself;" * for it appears to me but another name for necessity. — Did not Paul judge according to the appearance of things, and voluntarily

untarily act according to the *most agreeable motives*, when he persecuted the church, thinking that he did God good service ; but, the *state of his mind* being changed, and the appearance of things being different, did not *contrary motives* become the most agreeable, when he advocated its cause, and was persecuted for it unto death ? Did not the woman who anointed Christ, and the men who condemned and crucified him, act according to the *most agreeable motives*, and according to the *appearances of things* to their minds ? Would it have been possible that the Jews should have crucified Christ, if, according to the *appearance of things* to their minds, they verily believed he was the Son of God, and came to save them from eternal perdition ? Is not, " *Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do,*" a proof of their ignorance ?

If it be granted that the motives by which the soul *freely determines itself* are those which are *most agreeable to it*, does it not follow that Adam and Eve determined themselves by motives the *most agreeable* to their dispositions ? and have any of the *reputed righteous* done more ? But, if all men determine themselves by motives the *most agreeable* to the disposition of their minds, what becomes of the doctrine of SELF-DENIAL, of MERIT and DEMERIT, or of VIRTUE and VICE, in the *popular* acceptance of those words ? As it is said, previous to Adam and Eve's transgression, there was *no evil in the world*, nor even the *knowledge of evil*, is it not strange, then, on the hypothesis of *human liberty*, that such ideas should appear to the minds of Adam and Eve, and that they should be impressed with such sensations, as that *disobedience* should be the *most agreeable* to them ? — Does *human liberty* consist

in determining *FREELY* *contrary to volition*, or *without any*, or in *determining first*, and *willing afterward*?

P. 40. "Man, in his natural estate, is ignorant of God. He has not in himself, i. e. from his fallen, corrupted nature, any inward feeling or sensation of the divine mercy and love. 'The natural man receiveth not the things of the spirit of God; for they are foolishness unto him; neither can he know them, because they are spiritually discerned.' —

P. 41. "By the blessed agency of the Holy Spirit, the soul is awakened to a sense of the evil of sin." — Man's natural estate is his created estate, or the first mode of his existence; which, I think, cannot be properly called a *depraved* or *corrupted* state; for that, upon our author's principles, supposes an alteration, in the mode of a being, for the worse, produced by a free act of the mind in transgressing a moral law; for, to be a sinner, blameable or punishable, supposes, upon his hypothesis, a power to act, or not to act, according to a known law: if, therefore, man, in his natural estate, transgressed the divine law, he was under a physical or natural necessity of transgressing it, and was no more justly blameable or punishable for transgressing it, than he would have been for having a *fever* or *fit of the stone*, and consequently not an object of *mercy* in his natural estate. Till a creature is *awakened*, and put into a capacity of perceiving that which is morally good, it cannot be chargeable with *formal* evil, or the *sin* of acting contrary to a law which has not been revealed to it, — *ergo*, is no *object of mercy*.

It appears, then, that man, in his *natural* estate, (which he did not give himself, nor could have prevented,) commits sin as a stone falls to the ground,

ground, *i. e.* by an absolute *necessity of nature*; and I conceive that every animal is under a physical necessity of acting or moving according to its nature, and that the contrary supposition implies a contradiction. Now, if a man, in his natural estate, is ignorant of God, and while the things of God lie beyond the reach of his natural perceptions, and before he has a feeling or sensation of God's mercy and love, endures any *evil* consequent on the transgression of another person, he suffers for what he could not prevent, and therefore was not *blameable*; and indeed, while I cannot help pitying such an object, I cannot look upon him as standing in need of *MERCY*. But Philaretus has attempted to shew that moral good is not the object of man's power, perception, or choice; that it comes not within the sphere of his ideas and feelings till he is awakened by the agency of God's holy Spirit; and yet that, in this estate, he is *corrupted and fallen*: — but fallen from what? — If a man never knew a better state than his natural estate, can it be said that he is fallen from what he never attained to or possessed? — I leave the reader to judge, whether this doctrine harmonizes with the divine attributes.

To account for the origin of evil, we must go up higher than Adam: he was tempted by the serpent, or the devil; but who tempted the devil before he fell? for he, as well as Adam, on the hypothesis of *human liberty*, determined himself by the *most agreeable motives* when he transgressed. If he was *perfectly happy* before his fall, how could he be capable of an evil inclination, or a desire or will to act contrary to the will or commandment of God? I suppose it

will be granted, that his state previous to his fall (that is to say, his created state) was a good state; and that, while he remained in that state, he had no inclination or desire of acting contrary to the divine will. *Good and evil, or virtue and vice, any more than motion and rest, happiness and misery, are not res or beings, but modi rerum or modes of beings.* If the fallen angels created state was a good state, what could alter it to an evil one? — The scripture says, "Out of the heart proceed evil thoughts." Matt. xv. 19. — What, out of a good heart? — How came the heart to be evilly affected?

A being can have no reason or motive to pursue that which does not appear to relate to his happiness. "Obligation (says a learned author) is the necessity of doing or omitting any action, in order to be happy." From which I infer, that a degree of *uneasiness*, which is an *evil*, is the cause of voluntary action or motion, as every being, when he acts or moves, means to get rid of some degree of pain, and to acquire some degree of pleasure; that is to say, means to better his condition.

May it not be said, that, if *necessity* makes God *directly* the author of *evil*, *human liberty* makes him *indirectly* the author of it? Is it not acknowledged that he could have prevented it? — If there are difficulties attending the doctrine of *necessity*, when applied to particular cases, is the doctrine of *human liberty* entirely free from them? Can its advocates clearly and rationally account for the introduction of evil? for the evil which children feel before they have any liberty, are capable of a law, or have personally transgressed it? or for the evil of pain, which animals inferior to man suffer, who
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are not the subjects of moral government, or capable of sinning? Can they account for the phenomena of lunatics, who involuntarily utter all manner of imprecations, are conscious of seeing external objects which they do not see, and of having done things which they have not done, — of being what they are not, (princes, emperors, dogs, or cats,) and of feeling remorse for actions which they never committed? — In a word, is it not as difficult (to say no more) to account for *evil*, on the hypothesis of *human liberty*, as on that of *necessity*?



CHAP. V.

Of moral right and wrong. — Evil the effect of God's goodness. — The prayer of Philaretus Calvinistical.

BUT it is said, that "man is so constituted, that he has some knowledge of moral RIGHT and WRONG; the former he calls VIRTUE, and the latter VICE. — He feels, on a review of some actions, a peculiar pleasurable sensation, called the testimony of his own conscience;* and, on the review of others, a peculiar painful sensation, called REMORSE." — Granted: God has, in wisdom and goodness, ordained that it should be so. But moral approbation and disapprobation are sensations, or perceptions, to which the mind is passive; and, though all men have such sensations and perceptions, yet some men approve actions as

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* Conscience comes from *con*, and *scire*, to know.

just or right, which others deem wrong or criminal; of which numerous instances might be given; but I study brevity. See *Locke on innate practical Principles*, chap. iii. — If Philaretus had been born and educated at CONSTANTINOPLE, in all probability, he would have adopted the doctrine of ABSOLUTE NECESSITY, as well as have zealously espoused the doctrine of the KORAN.

P. 99. “*The doctrine of necessity makes God directly the author of all the evil in the world.*” Far be it from me to intend, by any thing I have said or shall say, to make God the author of EVIL, in the sense which Philaretus supposes to follow from the doctrine of NECESSITY: I detest the idea; and, if any of my positions imply it, I do declare it was not intended by me. Philaretus, indeed, supposes that God could have prevented evil; but to me it appears a contradiction, the object of no power. If Philaretus were to ask me why I think it a contradiction, I should answer, because God did not prevent it; for I conclude, that, if a GOD OF INFINITE WISDOM, POWER, and GOODNESS, could have prevented it, he would not have wanted a WILL to prevent it.

To give pain to any being is a material evil; but, if the design of the agent who inflicted it be ultimately to communicate a greater good, which could not have been communicated without inflicting it, the inflicting pain (*a material evil*) is a FORMAL good. — Suppose that a man is capable of communicating 10 degrees of pleasure to some other man, and yet that it could not be communicated without subjecting him to 2 degrees of pain, would it not be deemed a virtuous benevolent act, in him, to communicate the 10 degrees

degrees of pleasure, though he should necessarily subject him to the 2 degrees of pain?

It is reputed a degree of virtue, amongst men, for one man to communicate any degree of good, designedly, to any other man or men; and, if he designedly communicates the greatest degree which he is capable of communicating, it is reputed, in him, the greatest degree of human virtue: — may we not hence infer, analogically, that the SUPREME BEING, THE COMMON FATHER OF US ALL, WHO IS INHERENTLY WISE AND GOOD, will communicate the greatest possible degree of good, i. e. happiness, to every species of sentient creatures, which they are capable of?

P. 123. “ May the great God arise, and by his power prevail in our hearts. May he give us the wisdom that is from above, which is pure and peaceable. May he turn our attention to the inward state of our mind, and begot in us an expectation and waiting for the arising and manifestation of Christ in his redeeming power to the soul: — then shall we know what this meaneth: “ We all, with open face, beholding, as in a glass, the glory of the Lord, are changed into the same image, from glory to glory, by the Spirit of the Lord.”

I freely confess, that I am one of the many that do not understand this text. — Does it not then follow, that God hath not arisen in my heart? — that HIS power hath not PREVAILED in it? — that he hath not GIVEN ME the wisdom that is from above? — that he has not TURNED my attention to the inward state of my mind, and that I am not yet AWAKENED? — that he hath not BEGOT IN ME an expectation and waiting for the arising and manifestation of Christ in his REDEEMING power? — If so, am not I NECESSARILY ignorant of the meaning

meaning of this text? — This concluding *wish* or *prayer* of Philaretus appears to me CALVINISTICAL, — the very doctrine which he calls HORRIBLE.*

It is given to you to know the mysteries of the kingdom of heaven; but to them it is not given. Matt. xiii. 11. — *Thou hast hid their heart from understanding.* Job xvii. 4. — *Turn thou me, and I shall be turned.* — *Surely, after I was turned, I repented; and after that I was instructed.* Jer. xxxi. 18, 19.



CHAP. VI.

On the liberty of indifference.

IN the Appendix to the 52d volume of the Monthly Review, under the article of Speculative Philosophy, we have an account of an ingenious Essay concerning the *Liberty of Indifference*, by Mr. Beguelin; upon which, with proper deference to the superior judgement of the Reviewers, I shall make a few observations.

The Reviewers say, (p. 580.) “ The reasoning of our academician may be illustrated by an example. — ‘ When Demosthenes refused to purchase a statue of Phidias, which struck his fancy, the enormous price demanded was the circumstance, or motive, that determined the Athenian orator to this refusal: he looked upon the possession of an Attic talent as preferable to that of the

* I am not a Calvinist. — I do not believe that God has predestinated any of his creatures to eternal misery.

the statue. But it may well be presumed, that the orator would have willingly expended a hundred drachmas to obtain the statue. Now, between 100 drachmas and the Attic talent there must necessarily have been a price, which, had it been demanded by the seller, would have placed Demosthenes in an equilibrium, in which the reasons for giving or refusing the price must have appeared to him directly equal. But he must, however, either have accepted or refused; and, whether he did the one or the other, his WILL * must have determined itself, without a preponderating motive."

A *liberty of indifference*, I conceive, is no more than a being free from a desire of certain objects in the view of the mind; i. e. neither liking nor disliking them. I do, indeed, admit, that the soul's first state or mode of being was that of an *equilibrium*, or perfect *indifference* to every thing; for, not yet having the knowledge or perception of any thing, it was a mere *tabula rasa*, without ideas or impressions: but, being immediately encompassed with motives, and acted upon by them, it consequently was put out of a state of *equilibrium* or *indifference*. Perception implies impression, and impression motion; for I cannot imagine that the soul can be impressed, or have a perception, without being *moved* or *acted upon*; since, unless perceptions act upon, or move, the mind, they cannot excite any sensation in it, or indeed be perceived.

I cannot conceive that a being can have equal degrees of inclination for two objects at the *same time*, any more than that two bodies can co-exist in the *same* portion of space at the *same time*; and

* The power of determination, I conceive, belongs not to the WILL.

and therefore think it cannot be in the state of *indifference*, or *equilibrium*, which Beguelin has supposed. Different, and even contrary, motives may alternately *succeed* each other so rapidly, (which is often the case,) as that a sufficient space of time shall not intervene for an *actual determination* to take place or be performed: but if, after a volition is excited by a motive to act *one way*, it be not, by the influence of another motive, terminated by a volition to *forbear* acting or to act *another way*, an act corresponding thereto (all external impediments being removed) must inevitably take place. I therefore conclude it impossible that Phidias could have fixed a price on the statue that must necessarily have placed Demosthenes in a state of *indifference*, in which the reasons for accepting and refusing would have appeared to him directly equal at the *same time*. The influence of every *motive*, as well as every *volition*, *motion*, and *action*, must have a beginning and an end, and therefore cannot be completed in one point of duration: one point, at least, must exist between the two extremes. Equal weights, placed upon each lever of a balance, would make a perfect *equilibrium*, which is effected by the *equal* pressure of the weights upon the levers at the *same time*; but *different motives* cannot influence the mind at the *same time*, and therefore cannot produce *opposite* inclinations, desires, or volitions, at the *same time*. Suppose that a beam be suspended in such a manner, that, if either lever is made to descend 10 inches, it will press upon a spring, and discharge a pistol: now, if equal weights be placed alternately on both sides of its axis or center of gravity, so rapidly as not to allow a sufficient space of time for either end of the

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the beam to descend lower than $9\frac{1}{4}$ inches, neither of the pistols can be discharged, any more than if the equal weights had been placed, at the *same time*, on the different levers, and an *equilibrium* had been effected. Suppose, then, the seller, Phidias, to fix a price which suggested *equal motives* for accepting and refusing; yet, as those motives could not operate on, or influence, the mind of Demosthenes at the *same time*, (they alternately influencing his mind so *rapidly* as not to allow a *sufficient* space of time for *actually* determining,) it were impossible that Demosthenes could *actually determine*; for he would be (to speak properly) *deliberating*.

Suppose that A is now at a public auction, when a statue is put up for sale to the highest bidder before the expiration of a lamp. One minute before the lamp expires B offers 95 pounds, and he and every person present, except A, are determined and *actually* declare that they will not advance on that sum. The question then is, whether A will become the purchaser at 100 pounds. Suppose equal motives, for and against, alternately succeed each other, and influence his mind so *rapidly* as not to allow a space of time for the *act* of bidding 100 pounds to be performed before the lamp expires: in such a case, the time or opportunity of *actually* accepting elapsed before he could put an end to *deliberation*.

Demosthenes's Attic talent, like other portions of matter, was indifferent to motion and rest, *i. e.* to remaining in his pocket or being given to Phidias in exchange for a statue: it required not a determination of his mind, or a volition, to retain it in his pocket, though it required a determination, or volition, to part with it or transfer it to Phidias.

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When two objects are agreeable to the mind, and both cannot be attained, it is determined to choose that which is the most agreeable, and the choice of that one, a positive determination, implies a refusal of the other without a negative determination of the mind. — A needle, placed at an equal distance between two magnets of equal power, will not be moved at all; but, if it be placed nearer to one magnet than to the other, then it will, by one motion, approach to one and recede from the other.

C H A P. VII.

The cause of moral evil, or sin. — Of affliction and punishment. — Texts in favour of necessity. — Conclusion.

THE following propositions, I presume, are incontrovertible.

When a creature DESIRES, or hath any INCLINATION to or for an APPARENT or REAL absent GOOD, or to alter its CONDITION, it implies that it is not PERFECTLY satisfied with the good things it does POSSESS, or not ENTIRELY happy in its PRESENT condition, but feels some degree of UNEASINESS, which is an EVIL.

EVIL, as EVIL, cannot be the CHOICE of any being. If ADAM and EVE, in PARADISE, desired,* or had an inclination for, the fruit of the forbidden tree, it is evident that the fruit of all the o-

* The law, which forbids the commission of a crime, does certainly imply that we should not desire to commit it,

ther trees, of which they were allowed to eat, did not FULLY satisfy them; *i. e.* they were not *completely* happy in PARADISE; † for UNEASINESS, OR PAIN, in *any* degree, is an EVIL. I do therefore apprehend, that there was NATURAL EVIL, OR EVIL OF DEFECT, (*i. e.* pain,) in the world, previous to MORAL EVIL, and that this *evil of defect* necessitated *moral evil*.

The very apprehension of any being, that it might be *happier*, implies that it is not yet *entirely happy*; and, as it cannot help judging and being impressed with agreeable or disagreeable sensations according to the appearance of things, those measures which appear likely to *increase* its *happiness*, or *lessen* its *pain*, & will *necessarily* be adopted or chosen, and (all external impediments being removed) will *necessarily* be pursued. If it be said, that *moral evil* preceded *natural evil*, and that *natural evil* followed as a *punishment*, *per necessitatem consequentie*, or by divine appointment, then it may be inferred, that all the *evil* or *pain*, felt by *infants* who have *not sinned*, and *inferior animals* which *cannot sin*, is a *punishment* inflicted on them for an *offence* which they *never committed*; which surely cannot be allowed.

GOOD and EVIL, OR PLEASURE and PAIN, may be distinguished into *natural* and *moral*, *natural* pleasure and the *pleasure* of reward, and the *evil* of *natural affliction* and of the *affliction* called

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† Is it reasonable to think that man can be *better* out of Paradise than he was in it?

§ “The removal or lessening of a pain operates as a pleasure, and the loss or diminution of a pleasure is to be accounted as a pain; as, in all computations, the subtraction of a negative quantity is the addition of a positive, and subtraction of a positive the addition of a negative.”

led punishment. Every punishment is an affliction, but every affliction is not a punishment : every reward is a pleasure, but every pleasure is not a reward. The pleasure which follows actions morally good is the pleasure called reward ; but the pain or evil of REMORSE, which follows actions morally evil, is called the affliction of punishment. Pain and pleasure are generically different ; but all kinds of pain are generically the same ; and all kinds of pleasure are also generically the same. If natural evil be the cause of moral evil, the important question then is, whether natural evil could have been prevented ; that is to say, whether a creature can be uninterruptedly or entirely happy, or without the evil of defect, throughout the whole of its duration. This is no question with me : I cannot help thinking that all evil is for the best, that is to say, made subservient to the production of a greater good. The evil of REMORSE and PUNISHMENT, I conceive, is designed, by the CREATOR, to cure, ULTIMATELY, if it be possible, a natural or necessary disease in his creatures,* which could not have been prevented ; nor doth it, in my judgement, imply a contradiction to suppose that an evil, which could not be prevented, may yet be ultimately cured, especially when the patient is under the sole care and management of an infinitely wise, good, and omnipotent PHYSICIAN.

Although affliction cometh not forth of the dust, neither doth trouble spring out of the ground, yet man is born unto trouble, as the sparks fly upward. Job v. 6, 7.

For, as the heavens are higher than the earth, so are my ways than your ways, and my thoughts than

* Evil desires indicate mental diseases.

than your thoughts: for, as the rain cometh down, and the snow, from heaven, and returneth not thither, but watereth the earth, and maketh it bring forth and bud, that it may give seed to the sower and bread to the eater; so shall my word be, that goeth forth out of my mouth; it shall not return unto me void, but it shall accomplish that which I please, and it shall prosper in the thing whereto I sent it [*i. e.* the ultimate good and happiness of his creatures]. Isaiah lv. 9, 10, 11.

— Who worketh all things according to the counsel of his own will. Ephes. i. 11.

For it is God which worketh in you, both to will and to do, of his good pleasure. Phil. ii. 13.

Thy people shall be willing in the day of thy power. Psalm cx. 3.

He will subdue our iniquities. Micah vii. 19.

The Lord of hosts hath sworn, saying, Surely, as I have thought, so shall it come to pass, and as I have purposed, so shall it stand. Isaiah xiv. 24.

Human beings are so constituted, as that perhaps no two ever thought alike upon every subject of physics, metaphysics, ethics, or theology. What different notions of religion and morality are to be found in this little island, as well as abroad! The holy scriptures are accepted in different senses by the learned and the unlearned; not only by superficial enquirers, but by the most devout and studious men. Nevertheless there are pious worthy members to be found under every denomination. The longer I live, the more love I feel for God, my Creator and Governor, and for my fellow-creatures; and I cannot help putting up my prayers to God, the AUTHOR of all good, that we may be so disposed as no longer to quarrel about our opinions, any more than

than about our *features*; — that all *bitterness, wrath, and anger, and clamour, and evil-speaking, may be put away, with all malice*; and that *PEACE, GOOD-WILL, and every CHRISTIAN VIRTUE, may increase amongst mankind every where.*

I have now considered the principal objections to the doctrine of *philosophical necessity*, and, if my arguments are not just, I wish they may be clearly confuted; for my mind is open to information, from whatever quarter, or from whom soever it may come; and I can honestly say, with Philaretus, (see page 85.) *I am not engaged in the defence of a party, nor any opinion as the opinion of a party, but only of what I believe to be the truth.* As to what effect the doctrine of *philosophical necessity*, if it were universally received, would produce amongst mankind, I presume, neither *Philaretus* nor *Philaletes* can divine; but I confide in the ALMIGHTY, the SOLE GOVERNOR OF THE UNIVERSE AND ALL CREATURES IN IT, that no event which shall not be, ultimately, for the BEST upon the whole (*i. e.* the happiness of his creatures) will be suffered to happen.

Which of our opinions is the most consistent with the idea of an OMNIPOTENT, WISE, and GOOD GOD, I shall now leave the reader to judge at his leisure: I have not meant *absolutely to determine*, but have candidly given my opinion. — *He that is able to receive it, let him receive it.*

PHILALETHES.

F I N I S.

E R R A T A.

Page 3, line 1, for page 12 read page 11.

Page 4, in the 2d-note, read *and the before power.*

Page 9, line 30, for *affect* read *affects*.